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Footnotes 
1. Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012).
2. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
3. Agents actually obtained a warrant, but it was valid for 10 days
and authorized placing the device while the vehicle was in the
District of Columbia. Agents installed the device on the 11th day
and in Maryland.
4. Id. at 949.
5. Id.
6. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953.
8. Id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring). He asked, amusingly, whether
it was possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted
himself in a coach and remained there for a period of time to mon-
itor the movements of the coach’s owner, saying that this “would
have required either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or
both—not to mention a constable with incredible fortitude and
patience.” Id. at 958 n.3.
The United States Supreme Court’s 2011-2012 Term wasbig. The headline on the civil side of the docket was theAffordable Care Act decision.1 The blockbuster on the
criminal side was United States v. Jones,2 the Global Positioning
System (GPS) monitoring case. In Jones, the Court showed that
some old things can be new again—the justices gave us “new”
ways of thinking about Fourth Amendment searches. There
were other key criminal-law rulings as well, including on effec-
tive assistance and plea negotiations, confrontation, juries and
criminal fines, juvenile life-without-parole sentences, and dou-
ble jeopardy. And as in the previous Term, the Court issued sev-
eral opinions emphasizing the deference to be afforded state
courts on federal habeas corpus review. This article examines
some of the most notable criminal-law-related opinions of the
Supreme Court’s 2011 Term, focusing on those decisions that
have the greatest impact upon the states. It concludes with a
brief preview of the 2012-2013 Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The criminal case of the year was Jones, the GPS-monitoring
decision. Jones has broad implications for how we define a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The
majority gave us a trespass-based alternative to the familiar
“reasonable expectation of privacy” analysis, and even the con-
curring justices mustered five votes for a gloss on the reason-
able-expectation-of-privacy test. In other Fourth Amendment
rulings, the justices addressed jailhouse searches (rejecting a
broad challenge to visual strip searches of detainees), passed on
the Fourth Amendment aspects of the Arizona S.B. 1070 chal-
lenge, and, in two civil-rights matters, gave some guidance
about warrants and exigent circumstances.
GPS monitoring and a “new” trespass-based approach to
searches and seizures
The case began when agents suspected Antoine Jones of traf-
ficking in narcotics. Without a valid warrant,3 they installed a
GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a Jeep registered to
Jones’s wife. Agents used the device to track the vehicle’s move-
ments over the next 28 days, obtaining over 2,000 pages of
locational data, which was introduced at trial. The Court unan-
imously found that this violated the Fourth Amendment, and it
reversed Jones’s conviction, though the justices were split on
their reasoning.
The Court’s opinion was delivered by Justice Scalia, joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Sotomayor. They held that the government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information, and
that “such a physical intrusion would have been considered a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it
was adopted.”4 Until the latter half of the twentieth century,
“Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law
trespass.”5 The Court deviated from that property-based
approach beginning in Katz v. United States,6 with the develop-
ment of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” analyses.
Perhaps most significantly, the Jones majority held that the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test exists alongside (and
does not displace) a test grounded in the law of trespass.7 Thus,
the Court rejected the government’s claim that Jones had no
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment; the United States
had argued that Jones lacked a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the underbody of the Jeep and in the locations of the
Jeep on the public roads, which, after all, were visible to all.
Four justices (joined in part by a fifth) concurred on a very
different theory. They criticized the majority’s property-based
approach and would have found a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion applying the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. In
his concurrence for these justices, Justice Alito criticized the
majority for deciding the case based upon eighteenth-century
tort law, saying that “it is almost impossible to think of late-
eighteenth-century situations that are analogous to what took
place in this case.”8 He argued that the “reasonable expectation
of privacy” analysis was meant to replace a trespass-based
approach. Justice Alito wrote that the Court’s approach created
a number of difficulties and anomalies, including that it
attached great significance to placing the GPS device as
opposed to long-term monitoring using the device; it provided
no protection if the device was attached prior to the car being
turned over to a bailee for his use; the outcome may vary
according to property laws in the states; and reliance on the
law of trespass may “present particularly vexing problems in
cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making elec-
tronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be
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9. Id. at 962.
10. Id. at 964.
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13. Id. at 955-57.
14. Id. at 954 (Scalia, J).
15. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Fabio Arcila, Jr., GPS
Tracking Out of Fourth Amendment Dead Ends: United States v.
Jones and the Katz Conundrum, 91 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2012).
16. See United States v. Luna-Santillanes, 2012 WL 1019601 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2012); United States v. Hanna, 2012 WL 279435
(S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2012).
17. See State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 498-99 (S.D. 2012).
18. See Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveil-
lance.html?pagewanted=all (reporting 1.3 million demands for
subscriber information in 2011 alone).
19. See Catherine Crump, Location Tracking After United States v.
Jones: Continued Uncertainty Harms Americans’ Privacy, 91 CRIM.
L. RPTR. 577 (BNA July 11, 2012).
20. See United States v. Ortiz, 2012 WL 2951391 (E.D. Pa. July 20,
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http://news.yahoo.com/supreme-court-ruling-prompts-fbi-turn-
off-3-154046722--abc-news.html (describing comments of FBI
general counsel, Andrew Weissman).
23. 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).
tracked.”9 However, the concurring justices also acknowledged
that the Katz analysis was not without problems in cases like
this. Katz depends upon the assumption that a hypothetical
reasonable person has a stable set of expectations of privacy,
and technological advances may lead to changes in those
expectations and periods where expectations may be in flux.
Also, though the use of long-term GPS monitoring in most
investigations violates expectations of privacy—“society’s
expectation” has been that agents and others could not
“secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an
individual’s car for a very long period”—the concurring jus-
tices declined to “identify with precision the point at which the
tracking of [Jones’s] vehicle became a search, for the line was
surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”10 The concurring jus-
tices also refrained from deciding whether the same outcome
would follow “in the context of investigations involving extra-
ordinary offenses.”11
Justice Sotomayor provided the fifth vote to make Justice
Scalia’s trespass-based approach the decision of the Court, but
her concurrence revealed a willingness to reconsider basic
aspects of privacy analysis as well as general support for the
approach taken by Justice Alito. She concurred with Justice
Alito in finding that “at the very least, ‘longer term GPS moni-
toring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expecta-
tions of privacy.’”12 Justice Sotomayor also underscored that
records of a person’s public movements provide a wealth of
detail about that person’s familial, political, professional, reli-
gious, and sexual associations, which the government can store
and mine years in the future. Justice Sotomayor would take
these into account in determining whether there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in one’s public movements, and she
would not find it dispositive that the government might obtain
the fruits of GPS monitoring through lawful conventional sur-
veillance techniques. She would be willing to reconsider the
notion that an individual has no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in information that they voluntarily disclose to third par-
ties.13 The bottom line: there were five votes for finding a
Fourth Amendment violation based upon Justice Scalia’s tres-
pass theory and five votes for finding a violation based upon
some form of reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis.
One other important point to note: contrary to many press
reports, Jones does not hold that a
warrant is necessarily required for
GPS monitoring. The issue in the
case was whether placing and
using the device constituted a
search or seizure within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. The
Court did not reach the question
whether the search was reasonable
without a warrant, as that issue
was not raised below.14
For those who study and write
about the Fourth Amendment, Jones offered up a veritable
feast.15 For judges, lawyers, and officers who have to apply
Jones in the real world, the decision raised as many questions as
it answered. Some of the unresolved issues include: What acts
of trespass may amount to a search? Can a property interest
provide “standing” to bring a suppression motion even if the
defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the place searched or object seized?16 Just what is “long-term”
monitoring under the approach of the concurring justices?17
What is an “extraordinary” investigation? In light of the mil-
lions of requests made to cellphone carriers for subscriber
information,18 what does Jones mean for users of mobile
devices?19 Does the automobile or any other exception permit
the State to place a GPS device on a vehicle with probable cause
but without a warrant?20 Should evidence be suppressed when
officers objectively relied upon pre-Jones precedent?21 The FBI
is reportedly preparing memoranda to guide agents’ use of GPS
and other devices post-Jones.22 The FBI certainly has a lot of
issues to address.
Jail searches
It was no Jones, but another highly anticipated Fourth
Amendment case was Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of
County of Burlington,23 which addressed intrusive searches of
arrestees. The plaintiff in this civil-rights action was arrested on
an outstanding warrant for failure to pay a fine, and he was held
for six days in two different jails. He was subjected to a visual
inspection of his entire body, including his genitals. The plain-
tiff alleged that a policy of strip searching, without reasonable
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(1984)).
25. Id. at 1521-22.
26. Id. at 1523.
27. Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 1525, 1528 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1526-28.
30. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
31. Justice Kagan recused herself.
32. Given the federal government’s broad authority over immigration,
Arizona could not criminalize a non-citizen’s failure to carry an
alien registration document or a non-citizen’s unauthorized appli-
cation for employment (or the person’s actual work). Nor could
Arizona authorize officers to arrest without a warrant if there was
probable cause to believe a person has committed a removable
offense. See 132 S. Ct. at 2503, 2505, 2507.
33. Id. at 2509.
34. Id. at 2524, 2529 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Scalia concurred with the decision to uphold this
part of the statute but saw no reason to address the Fourth
Amendment issue. See id. at 2511, 2516 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Thomas wrote separately on
the preemption question. See id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
35. 132 S. Ct. 1235 (2012).
suspicion, those arrested for minor
offenses violates the Fourth
Amendment. The Court disagreed,
5-4.
Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy first stressed the difficul-
ties of operating a detention center,
though the Court acknowledged
that people arrested for minor
offenses may be among the
detainees. There are perhaps two
most notable aspects of the major-
ity’s opinion. First, the justices
emphasized that “deference must
be given to the officials in charge of
the jail unless there is ‘substantial
evidence’ demonstrating their response to the situation is exag-
gerated.”24 Second, the Court was pointedly determined to craft
a bright-line rule rather than require jail officials to decide on a
detainee-by-detainee basis whether a visual strip search is per-
mitted.25 Framed this way, the majority concluded that the
search procedures at the two jails “struck a reasonable balance
between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.”26
Justice Alito joined the Court’s opinion but concurred to empha-
size the limits of the holding. He especially noted that the case
concerned arrestees who were committed to the general popula-
tion of the jail and whose searches did not involve physical con-
tact. He pointed out that the opinion does not hold that it is
always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an arrestee
whose detention has not yet been reviewed by a judicial officer
and who could be held apart from the general population.27
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, dissented. They underscored that a visual strip search is
a serious invasion of privacy and that people arrested for minor
offenses have been subjected to the humiliations of such a
search. While also acknowledging that managing a jail is a dif-
ficult undertaking, the dissenting justices could find “no con-
vincing reason indicating that, in the absence of reasonable sus-
picion, involuntary strip searches of those arrested for minor
offenses are necessary . . . .”28 The dissenters argued that these
procedures were sufficient to detect injuries, diseases, or gang
tattoos, and that there were no clear examples of instances in
which contraband was smuggled into the general population of
the jail during intake that could not have been discovered
under a reasonable-suspicion standard.29
Investigative detentions
Arizona v. United States,30 the S.B. 1070 decision, was a cross-
over hit: the Court touched on the Fourth Amendment in addi-
tion to its more important holding about the federal power over
immigration. A 5-3 majority of the Court31 found that several
parts of Arizona’s controversial immigration-related law (S.B.
1070) were preempted by federal law.32 But all eight participat-
ing justices agreed that Arizona might be able to implement a
statute requiring officers to make a reasonable effort to deter-
mine the immigration status of any person they stop, detain, or
arrest on some other legitimate basis, provided the officers have
reasonable suspicion that the person is a non-citizen and is not
lawfully present in the country. The justices also declined to
overturn a provision that any person arrested shall have their
immigration status determined prior to release.
The plaintiffs had claimed that determining immigration sta-
tus may unduly prolong a detention or delay a release, which
may violate the Fourth Amendment. However, the statute was
yet to be construed by the state courts or applied by officers. As
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, if the statute is construed
to require officers “to conduct a status check during the course
of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been
released, the provision would likely survive preemption—at
least absent some showing that it has other consequences that
are adverse to federal law and its objectives.”33 Justice Alito
wrote separately to emphasize that officers already had the
power to inquire about immigration status of people who are
lawfully detained, and this part of the statute does not expand
that power. He also noted that while the statute should not lead
to federal constitutional violations, “there is no denying that
enforcement . . . will multiply the occasions on which sensi-
tive Fourth Amendment issues will crop up.”34 He suggested
some ways that Arizona might mitigate that risk.
Qualified immunity, warrant searches, and exigent 
circumstances
Two civil-rights cases about qualified immunity gave the
Court an opportunity to address aspects of warrant searches
and the exigent-circumstances doctrine. 
In Messerschmidt v. Millender,35 a victim reported that her ex-
boyfriend, a reputed gang member, had attacked her and fired a
sawed-off shotgun at her car. Officers prepared arrest and search
warrants. The search warrants sought, broadly, all firearms (not
just the sawed-off shotgun) and evidence of gang membership.
Executing the warrant, officers searched the home of the sus-
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pect’s foster mother, where they found a shotgun and ammuni-
tion. The plaintiffs alleged that the warrants were overbroad and
not supported by probable cause. The Supreme Court ruled 6-3
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts,
notes that the same standard of objective reasonableness that
applies in the context of a suppression motion under United
States v. Leon36 is involved in determining whether an officer
should be denied qualified immunity because an affidavit is so
lacking in indicia of probable cause. The threshold for meeting
this standard is high. Under the circumstances of this case, an
officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe
that the suspect had other weapons, and that seizing the
weapons was necessary to protect the victim. Further, it would
not be unreasonable for an officer to believe that evidence
regarding gang membership would help in prosecuting the sus-
pect for the attack. Without deciding whether the circumstances
actually established probable cause, the Court found that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The majority
emphasized that the officers here “sought and obtained approval
of the warrant application from a superior and a deputy district
attorney before submitting it to the magistrate.”37
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented,
arguing that there was no basis to seek evidence of gang affili-
ation in this non-gang-related assault or reasonable basis to
search for weapons other than the gun used in the assault.
They also complained that the majority erred in giving weight
to the fact that the officers had sent the warrant application to
superiors and obtained a judge’s approval.38 Justice Kagan con-
curred in part and dissented in part, finding a middle ground
between the majority and dissenting justices. She thought that
the officers were entitled to immunity with respect to the
search for weapons, but not the search for evidence of gang
membership.39
The other case was Ryburn v. Huff,40 where the Court clari-
fied principles of qualified immunity and the exigent-circum-
stances doctrine. Four officers were investigating an allegation
that a high-school student threatened to shoot up his school.
They went to his home and knocked, but no one answered.
Eventually, the student’s mother came out of the home with her
son and stood on the front steps. The mother declined the offi-
cers’ request to interview young man inside. After she was
asked if there were any guns in the home, she turned around
and ran into the house. The officers followed. The family sued
because of the warrantless entry. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and summarily reversed the court of appeals, deter-
mining that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.
In a per curiam opinion, the justices first noted that “[a] rea-
sonable police officer could read” the Court’s prior decisions to
mean that an officer may enter a residence without a warrant “if
the officer has a reasonable basis for concluding that there is an
imminent threat of violence.”41 Taking the events together
rather than in isolation, reason-
able officers could have come to
the conclusion that there was
an imminent threat to safety.
The mother ran into the home
immediately after being asked
about the presence of weapons.
While she was lawfully entitled
to enter her home, “there are
many circumstances in which
lawful conduct may portend
imminent violence.”42
FIFTH AMENDMENT—
MIRANDA
The Term gave us two
Miranda decisions, including
Howes v. Fields,43 which
addressed Miranda custody and inmates. Fields received the
most attention, but Bobby v. Dixon,44 a per curiam summary
reversal, may turn out to be more significant. Dixon has impli-
cations for situations in which a defendant makes an anticipa-
tory invocation, and it also is the first Supreme Court decision
to construe the 2004 opinions in Missouri v. Seibert.45
In the first of the two cases, Fields was serving a sentence in
a county jail. Officers wanted to question him about whether he
had earlier engaged in sex with a young boy. Fields was escorted
from his cell to a conference room in the jail, where he was ques-
tioned without Miranda warnings for five to seven hours. At the
outset, he was told that he was free to return to his cell and later
was reminded that he could leave whenever he wanted. Fields
confessed, although he allegedly said several times that he no
longer wanted to speak with the deputies. The state courts
found that his confession was admissible, ruling that he was not
in Miranda custody during the questioning. On federal habeas
corpus review, the court of appeals found this conclusion con-
trary to clearly established federal law, the standard required to
grant relief under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court of appeals determined that
Miranda custody exists per se when an individual is imprisoned
and is questioned in private about events outside of the prison.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
In an opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas wrote that prior
decisions did not establish such a categorical rule. Thus, the
state-court decisions were not contrary to clearly established fed-
eral law. Morever, even had the case been brought on direct
appeal, and not judged under the deferential AEDPA standards,
the court of appeals ruling was wrong. Custody is determined
from the objective circumstances of the interrogation and from
the point of view of a reasonable person, in light of all of the cir-
cumstances. Citing Berkemer v. McCarty,46 the Court emphasized
that not all restraints on the freedom of movement amount to
The [lower court]
determined that
Miranda custody
exists per se when
an individual is
imprisoned and is
questioned in 
private about
events outside of
the prison. The
Supreme Court
unanimously
reversed.
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51. See id. at 31-32.
52. See id. at 27.
53. See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 176-82. McNeil sought the greater protec-
tion of Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), as his Sixth Amendment
right had attached for a separate offense, but an Edwards invoca-
tion prevents officers from reinitiating an interrogation on any
offense. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177. The McNeil Court’s reference to
the inability to invoke Miranda anticipatorily came in a footnote,
where the majority disputed a claim by dissenting justices that
lawyers could simply invoke the Miranda-Edwards right during
their initial court appearances. Id. at 182 n.3. The Dixon Court
also cited Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), for the
proposition that Miranda applies to custodial interrogations, but
the Court made that point only to contrast the scope of protec-
tions under Miranda-Edwards and the Sixth Amendment.
54. See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV.
1519, 1551-52 (2008); see also United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d
470, 476-77 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d
1148, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2006).
55. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12 (plurality opinion); id. at 618, 622
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
Miranda custody. There are reasons to
believe that imprisonment alone is not
enough to create Miranda custody,
including that when someone already
imprisoned is questioned, the circum-
stances generally do not involve the
shock that often accompanies an arrest.
Moreover, an individual is not likely to
be lured into speaking by hoping for prompt release.47
Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor)
agreed that the law was not clearly established in Fields’ favor,
and thus relief could not be granted under AEDPA. But had the
case been presented on direct appeal, these three justices would
have found that the questioning was custodial. They pointed to
the definition of custody in Miranda itself and stressed that
Fields was questioned incommunicado in a police-dominated
atmosphere, in an inherently stressful way, and that his freedom
of action was significantly curtailed.48
In the Term’s other Miranda case, Bobby v. Dixon, Dixon and
a co-defendant murdered the decedent to steal and sell his car.
Dixon used the victim’s documents to obtain an ID card, and he
forged a signature to cash the check for the sale of the car.
Officers had several distinct contacts with Dixon. First, there
was a chance non-custodial encounter at a police station. A
detective gave Dixon Miranda warnings and asked him about
the victim’s disappearance, but Dixon would not answer ques-
tions without his lawyer, and he left. Then, five days later, after
arresting Dixon for the forgery, detectives interrogated him
intermittently for several hours and intentionally did not pro-
vide Miranda warnings. They urged him to cut a deal before his
co-defendant did. Dixon made some inculpatory admissions
but claimed that the decedent gave him permission to sell the
car and that he did not know where the victim was. There was
a third encounter later that day, after Dixon’s co-defendant led
police to the victim’s grave. Dixon said that he had heard police
found a body, that he talked to his attorney, and that he wanted
to tell what happened. Officers then read Dixon his rights,
obtained an express Miranda waiver, and Dixon gave a detailed
confession. The federal court of appeals granted habeas corpus
relief, finding (among other things) that officers should not
have interrogated Dixon after he had previously refused to
speak with them without his lawyer present. And relying upon
Seibert, the lower court determined that Dixon’s confession was
the product of a deliberate question-first, warn-later strategy.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed.
In a unanimous per curiam opinion, the justices found that
Dixon’s refusal to speak without his lawyer present was not an
invocation of the right to counsel, which would have prevented
officers from initiating the subsequent interrogations. Dixon
was not in custody during the initial encounter. Quoting
McNeil v. Wisconsin,49 the Court said that it has “never held that
a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily, in a con-
text other than ‘custodial interrogation.’”50 In addition, there
was no two-step interrogation technique of the type con-
demned in Seibert. In Seibert, the defendant’s first, unwarned
interrogation left little unsaid, and after receiving midstream
warnings the defendant merely repeated what she said before.
By contrast, Dixon initially denied involvement in the murder,
and his full, warned confession contradicted his unwarned ear-
lier statements. Moreover, in Seibert, the justices were con-
cerned that the midstream Miranda warnings were part of a sin-
gle interrogation and could not have effectively apprised the
suspect that she had a choice whether to speak. Given the sep-
aration of Dixon’s interrogations, that was not a concern here.51
The Court concluded that it was not clear that the state court
erred at all, much less erred so transparently that Dixon could
meet the demanding AEDPA standards.52
Dixon is a sleeper, but I think it is significant in two respects.
First, although Dixon is an AEDPA case, the Court appeared
comfortable in allowing officers to initiate an interrogation of a
suspect who previously refused to speak without counsel after
having receiving Miranda warnings in a non-custodial setting.
While the Court in McNeil had indicated that invocations can-
not be made anticipatorily, the holding of McNeil was that a
request for counsel under the Sixth Amendment at an initial
court appearance was not equivalent to an invocation under
Arizona v. Edwards.53 Dixon appears to expand McNeil, perhaps
permitting officers to ignore an unambiguous invocation of the
right to counsel for an out-of-custody suspect, even when offi-
cers actually give warnings. Second, Dixon is the first Supreme
Court case to apply Seibert. While five justices in Seibert found
that officers employing a “question-first” strategy had violated
Miranda, and Seibert’s second statement was inadmissible,
courts have struggled to extract a workable rule from the vari-
ous opinions in Seibert.54 The plurality opinion focused on
whether midstream warnings could function effectively as
Miranda requires, while Justice Kennedy—who provided the
fifth vote in Seibert—advocated a “narrower test” applicable
only where the two-step technique was used in a calculated way
to undermine the warnings.55 In Dixon, the Court cited both
opinions, but the justices appeared to apply the plurality’s test.
64 Court Review - Volume 48 
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SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Sixth Amendment was quite prominent this Term. In
two cases, the Court found that defendants are entitled to the
effective assistance of counsel in advising them whether to
plead guilty or not. The justices also dealt again with forensic
reports and the Confrontation Clause, addressed the applica-
tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause to certain mistrials, and
determined that there is a right to a jury determination of facts
that determine the maximum sentence of a fine.
Effective assistance of counsel and pleas
In Missouri v. Frye,56 the first of the two cases related to assis-
tance of counsel and pleas, Frye was charged with driving with
a revoked license. He had been convicted of the same offense on
three earlier occasions, so this time he was charged with a felony
that carried a maximum sentence of 4 years. The prosecutor
wrote Frye’s lawyer and offered two possible deals: one would
require Frye to plead to the felony, with a recommendation for a
3-year probationary sentence with 10 days in jail; the other was
a misdemeanor with a recommended sentence of 90 days. Frye’s
lawyer failed to advise his client of the offers, which expired. Just
before his preliminary hearing, Frye was arrested again on a new
charge. Frye eventually pleaded guilty to the original charge
without an agreement. The prosecutor asked for, and the court
imposed, a 3-year sentence without any probation. Frye later
sought post-conviction relief, arguing that he would have
pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor had he known about the
offer. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the
failure of Frye’s lawyer to communicate the offer was ineffective
assistance of counsel and, if so, what the remedy might be.
In a 5-4 ruling, the Court found that counsel’s performance
was deficient under the first prong of Strickland v. Washington.57
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy pointed out that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to have counsel present
at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. Although no for-
mal court proceedings take place when a plea offer lapses or is
rejected, plea bargaining is prevalent in our justice system: 97%
of federal convictions and 94% of state convictions follow guilty
pleas. “The reality is that plea bargains have become so central
to the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process,” and
these must be met to afford “the adequate assistance of counsel
that the Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at
critical stages.”58 The majority refrained from defining the
responsibilities of defense counsel in plea bargaining. On the
facts of this case, it was clear that counsel’s performance was
deficient. “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a
plea” on favorable terms and conditions.59 The majority
remanded for the state courts to determine whether Frye was
prejudiced by counsel’s performance. While there was a reason-
able probability that Frye would have accepted the offer had it
been communicated (as shown by
his later plea to a felony charge),
Frye must also show that the offer
would have been adhered to by
the prosecution and accepted by
the trial court.60
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito, dissented. In
their view, “[c]ounsel’s mistake
did not deprive Frye of any sub-
stantive or procedural right; only
of the opportunity to accept a plea
bargain to which he had no enti-
tlement in the first place.”61 Moreover, the focus of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel cases is on the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding—whether the defendant was deprived of his consti-
tutional right to a fair trial—and Frye’s conviction (which fol-
lowed a guilty plea) was untainted by his lawyer’s error. The
dissenters also noted that lawyers have different negotiating
styles, and they faulted the majority for not “confronting the
serious difficulties that will be created by constitutionalization
of the plea-bargaining process.”62
The other plea-bargaining case of the Term, Lafler v.
Cooper,63 explored Strickland prejudice when a plea offer is
communicated but rejected.
Cooper was charged with 4 offenses including assault with
intent to murder. The prosecutor offered to dismiss 2 of the
charges and recommend a sentence of 51 to 85 months if
Cooper pleaded guilty to the other offenses. His lawyer, how-
ever, recommended rejecting the plea offer, advising that the
prosecution could not prove intent to kill because the victim
was shot below the waist. Cooper went to trial. He was con-
victed on all counts and received a mandatory minimum sen-
tence of 185 to 360 months. On federal habeas corpus review,
the State conceded that counsel’s advice was deficient, and
Cooper could meet the first prong of Strickland. But the State
argued that because Cooper received a fair trial, he was not
prejudiced. In a 5-4 decision, with the same lineup of justices
as in Frye, the Court disagreed.
Writing again for the majority, Justice Kennedy emphasized
that, under Strickland, a defendant must show that but for
counsel’s errors, “‘the result of the proceeding would have been
different.’”64 In this case, Cooper would be required to show
that but for the deficient advice, there is a reasonable probabil-
ity that he would have accepted the plea, that the prosecution
would not have withdrawn it, that the court would have
accepted it, “and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under
the offer’s terms would have been less severe than [what was] in
fact . . . imposed.”65 As in Frye, the majority held that the Sixth
Amendment does more than just protect the right to a fair trial.
Thus, the Court rejected the State’s argument that “[a] fair trial
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wipes clean any deficient perfor-
mance by defense counsel during
plea bargaining. That position
ignores the reality that criminal
justice today is for the most part
a system of pleas, not a system of
trials.”66 With respect to remedy,
the majority largely left it to the
trial court’s discretion but noted a
number of important considera-
tions. If the harm is receiving a
greater sentence, the remedy
might be to give the defendant
the sentence previously offered,
the sentence given after trial, or
something in-between. In other cases, particularly where the
offer was to plead to less serious counts, the prosecution might
be required to reoffer the plea. The correct remedy here was to
order the State to reoffer the deal. That would leave Cooper the
option of accepting it and would preserve the trial court’s dis-
cretion with respect to accepting it or not.
Again taking the lead for the four dissenting justices, Justice
Scalia castigated the majority for “open[ing] a whole new field
of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”67
He argued once more that the purpose of requiring effective
assistance of counsel is to assure a fair trial, and that requiring
the advice of competent counsel before rejecting a plea offer is
“a judicially invented right to effective plea bargaining.”68 Justice
Alito wrote an additional dissent to address the question of rem-
edy. He pointed out that where there is deficient legal advice
about a favorable plea offer, “the only logical remedy is to give
the defendant the benefit of the favorable deal. But such a rem-
edy would cause serious injustice in many instances . . . .”69
Confrontation and lab reports, revisited
The Supreme Court’s most important Confrontation Clause
decision of the past decade—Crawford v. Washington70—is the
gift that keeps on giving. Williams v. Illinois71 is the most recent
(though certainly not the last) of the Crawford line of cases. In
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts72 and Bullcoming v. New
Mexico,73 the justices held that the Confrontation Clause barred
the introduction of laboratory reports written by non-testifying
analysts. Depending upon one’s perspective, Williams may rep-
resent either an unwarranted retreat from these cases or a par-
tial return to sanity. But the Court was badly split and, whatever
one’s perspective on the outcome, Williams is simply a mess.
In Williams, a state police laboratory sent a vaginal swab
containing semen to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratories.
Cellmark produced a report with a DNA profile, which was
subsequently matched to a DNA profile obtained from a sample
of Williams’ blood. At trial, the State called an expert witness,
Sandra Lambatos, who was a forensic specialist at the state lab.
No one from Cellmark testified. While Lambatos did not quote
the Cellmark report and the report was never offered into evi-
dence, she replied “yes” to this question: “‘Was there a com-
puter match generated of the male DNA profile found in semen
from the vaginal swabs of [the victim] to a male DNA profile that
had been identified’” as Williams’?74 The Confrontation Clause
problem was that Lambatos “did not have personal knowledge
that the male DNA profile that Cellmark said was derived from
the crime victim’s vaginal swab sample was in fact correctly
derived from that sample. . . . Rather, she simply relied . . . upon
Cellmark’s report,” and Williams had no opportunity to cross-
examine its drafters.75 Five justices found no violation of the
Confrontation Clause. Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote
and possibly the controlling opinion; for ease of exposition, I
will address his opinion last.
In a plurality opinion by Justice Alito, four justices (all of
whom had dissented in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming) found
that Lambatos’ testimony was consistent with the established
rule that an expert may provide an opinion based on facts “even
if the expert lacks first-hand knowledge of those facts.”76
Although Lambatos testified that Williams’ profile matched the
DNA profile found in semen from the vaginal swabs of the vic-
tim, these four justices concluded that this testimony was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was just
part of the premise of the prosecutor’s question to the expert.77
These justices also found that even if the testimony had been
admitted for its truth, the Cellmark report was not testimonial
because it “was not prepared for the primary purpose of accus-
ing a targeted individual.”78
Four justices dissented in an opinion written by Justice
Kagan. They disputed the suggestion that “Lambatos merely
‘assumed’ that Cellmark’s DNA profile came from [the victim’s]
vaginal swabs”; rather, she affirmed without qualification that
the source of the profile was semen from the victim, and she
“became just like the surrogate witness in Bullcoming.”79 The
dissenting justices also disagreed with the conclusion that the
report was non-testimonial, noting that the analysis was con-
ducted to identify the assailant and to serve as evidence in a
criminal trial. 
Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote to affirm. He sided
with the dissenters in finding that the testimony was indeed
offered for its truth, writing that “[t]here is no meaningful dis-
tinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement so that
the factfinder may evaluate the expert’s opinion and disclosing
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that statement for its truth.”80 He also rejected the plurality’s
“primary purpose test” for determining if a statement is testi-
monial.81 However, in his view, the Cellmark report was “not a
statement by a ‘witnes[s]’ within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause. [It] lacks the solemnity of an affidavit or
deposition, for it is neither a sworn nor a certified declaration
of fact.”82 No other justice agreed with this formulation.83
Here is the bottom line: Five justices rejected the argument
that the State may simply introduce a forensic report through the
testimony of an expert by claiming that statements forming the
basis of an expert’s opinion are not asserted for their truth. Five
justices also rejected the argument that the Cellmark report was
non-testimonial because its “primary purpose” was to identify
an unknown assailant. Justice Thomas’ opinion only arguably
provides the narrowest ground for the decision and, thus, the
controlling opinion under the Marks rule.84 Indeed, the dis-
senters cautioned that until a majority reverses or confines
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, they “would understand them as
continuing to govern, in every particular, the admission of foren-
sic evidence.”85 Jeffrey Fisher, a close observer, summed up the
case this way: post-Williams, “the Confrontation Clause contin-
ues to deem formal forensic reports testimonial. That means that
drug, blood alcohol, fingerprint, ballistics, autopsies, and related
reports that typically involve testing by one person and that are
incriminating on their face will continue to be inadmissible
without the testimony of their authors (or some other method
of satisfying the Confrontation Clause).”86 Will we see efforts to
make reports less formal? Fisher thinks not, and Justice Thomas
noted that the Confrontation Clause reaches “‘technically infor-
mal statements when used to evade the formalized process.’”87
As I’ve said, Williams is a mess. Whatever it may stand for, it cer-
tainly cannot be the last word on the application of the
Confrontation Clause to forensic reports.
Double jeopardy and form of verdicts
The Court’s Double Jeopardy Clause case, Blueford v.
Arkansas,88 may have significant implications for states, depend-
ing upon how state law provides for the receipt of verdicts. The
defendant in Blueford was charged with capital murder and three
lesser-included offenses. The jury reported that it had voted
unanimously against guilt on both capital and first-degree mur-
der, but was deadlocked on manslaughter and had not voted on
negligent homicide. The way in
which the jury deliberated was in
accordance with Arkansas law
and the trial court’s instructions,
which required the jury to delib-
erate first on the most serious
offense and only consider a
lesser-included charge if all
twelve jurors first agreed to
acquit on the more serious
offense. When the jury reported
that it remained deadlocked, the
court declared a mistrial. When
the State sought to retry Blueford
on all charges, he argued that
double jeopardy prevented his retrial for capital and first-degree
murder. In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court rejected Blueford’s
claim.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice
Roberts. The majority held that there was no double jeopardy
bar to retrial because the jury had not finished its deliberations.
While the jury had voted on the two most serious charges, no
verdict was actually rendered or received. The jury was free to
reconsider what could have been a tentative or early vote on the
two most serious charges, and no final decision was reached.
Moreover, though the foreperson reported that the jury had
voted unanimously against guilt on the two most serious
charges, the Court said that it had “never required a trial court,
before declaring a mistrial because of a hung jury, to consider
any particular means of breaking the impasse—let alone to con-
sider giving the jury new options for a verdict.”89
Justice Sotomayor dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Kagan. They argued that while different jurisdictions may
have different procedures with respect to announcing verdicts
and entering judgments, the diversity of procedures has no con-
stitutional significance. Under Arkansas law, the jury must
acquit the defendant of the greater offense before deliberating
on the lesser-included offense. The forewoman’s “colloquy with
the judge [left] no doubt that the jury understood the instruc-
tions . . . .”90 “There is no reason to believe that the jury’s vote
was anything other than a verdict in substance. . . . And when
that decision was announced in open court, it became entitled
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to full double jeopardy protec-
tion.”91 The dissenters would
also “hold that the Double
Jeopardy Clause requires a trial
judge, in an acquittal-first juris-
diction, to honor a defendant’s
request for a partial verdict
before declaring a mistrial on the
ground of jury deadlock.”92
Apprendi and fine-only cases
In a line of cases beginning
with Apprendi v. New Jersey,93 the
Court held that the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to a jury determination of any
fact (other than the fact of a prior conviction) that increases a
defendant’s maximum potential sentence of imprisonment. In
Southern Union Co. v. United States,94 the Court ruled 6-3 that
this principle also applies to sentences of criminal fines.
The defendant company was charged with violating federal
environmental statutes by illegally storing liquid mercury. The
statute provided for a fine of up to $50,000 for each day of the
violation. The indictment and the jury verdict form both stated
a range of dates, and the jury was not asked to specify the dura-
tion of the violation. At sentencing, the judge concluded that
the jury had found a violation over the entire time period, and
set the maximum potential fine at $38.1 million. This was error,
said the Supreme Court. 
The majority and dissenting opinions both contain lengthy
dissertations on the historical role of the jury, particularly in
prosecutions involving fines. For our purposes, what is most
important is the Court’s discussion of the goals of the Apprendi
line of cases and the practical implications. The majority opin-
ion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, states that Apprendi’s core
concern is to preserve the jury’s role in determining facts that
warrant punishment. The jury is a “‘bulwark between the State
and the accused at the trial for an alleged offense,’”95 and there
is no principled basis to distinguish a sentence of a fine from a
sentence of imprisonment. “Where a fine is so insubstantial
that the underlying offense is considered ‘petty,’ the Sixth
Amendment right of jury trial is not triggered and no Apprendi
issue arises.”96 Dissenting, Justice Breyer, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Alito, argued that the outcome should have been
controlled by Oregon v. Ice,97 where the Court found that sen-
tencing judges could find facts that allow sentences to run con-
secutively as opposed to concurrently. The dissenters also con-
tended that extending Apprendi’s holding to fines would
straightjacket legislatures. Some “may choose to return to
highly discretionary sentencing, with its related risks of
nonuniformity.”98
While several parts of the decision may be worth studying,
there are two points to emphasize: first, there is no wiggle room
based upon the size of the potential fine. If the offense is non-
petty, and the defendant has the right to a jury trial, the rule
applies. Second, the rule applies to facts that determine the
maximum fine, even if the maximum fine is not imposed. In
this case, the maximum fine was $38.1 million, but the amount
imposed was $6 million.
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
The juvenile life-without-parole (LWOP) case, Miller v.
Alabama,99 was a quite significant Eighth Amendment ruling.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment “forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in
prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.”100
One petitioner, Jackson, was 14 when he helped rob a video
store, where a co-defendant killed the clerk. The second peti-
tioner, Miller, was also 14 when he and a co-defendant were
charged with murder during the course of arson. Both were
tried as adults and, upon conviction, both received a mandatory
LWOP sentence. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan drew on two strands
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. First, decisions such as
Graham v. Florida101 address mismatches between the culpabil-
ity of the class of offenders and the severity of the penalty. Thus,
Graham prohibits an LWOP sentence for a juvenile who has
committed a non-homicide offense. But Graham also likens
LWOP for juveniles to the death penalty itself, implicating a
second line of precedents, which require sentencing authorities
to consider the individual characteristics of the defendant and
the details of the crime before imposing a death sentence. As in
prior cases, the Court noted that “the distinctive attributes of
youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the
harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they com-
mit terrible crimes.”102 Here the mandatory sentencing schemes
prevented “assessing whether the law’s harshest term of impris-
onment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender.”103
Moreover, relying again upon Graham and precedents requiring
individualized sentencing in capital cases, a mandatory LWOP
sentence for juveniles impermissibly precludes consideration of
the defendant’s chronological age and its associated features—
including immaturity and failure to appreciate risks—as well as
family circumstances, the facts of the case, and the possibility of
rehabilitation. The majority swept aside the State’s arguments,
finding (among other things) that although it is possible for
juveniles to receive mandatory LWOP sentences in 29 U.S.
jurisdictions, the variance in the statutory schemes does not
show that the penalty has been fully and deliberately endorsed
by these legislatures. Further, the discretion in some statutes
dealing with transfer from juvenile to adult systems does not
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the beginning of the robbery-
homicides. However, according
to the notes of the lead investi-
gator, on the night of the mur-
ders, Boatner could not describe
the perpetrators other than that
they were black men. Five days
later, Boatner also said he could
not identify anyone because he
could not see their faces and he
would not know them if he saw
them. The prosecution did not
disclose these notes to the
defense. 
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that
Boatner’s statements were both exculpatory and material. There
was no inculpatory physical evidence. Boatner’s trial testimony
was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime, and the
undisclosed statements directly contradicted that testimony.
While the State has offered “a reason that the jury could have
disbelieved Boatner’s undisclosed statements,” it “gives us no
confidence that it would have done so.”114 The undisclosed
statements thus sufficed to undermine confidence in the con-
viction, and the Louisiana courts’ denial of post-conviction
relief was reversed. Justice Thomas, the lone dissenter, con-
tended that Smith had not established a reasonable probability
that the jury would have afforded the undisclosed statements
sufficient weight to alter its verdict. He argued that the major-
ity failed to consider the record as a whole and that the Court
improperly shifted the burden of proof to the State.115
Reliability of eyewitness identifications
In Perry v. New Hampshire,116 a closely watched case, the
Court turned aside a Due Process Clause challenge to the admis-
sibility of an eyewitness identification. A witness called police to
report a person breaking into cars in a parking lot early one
morning. Officers stopped the defendant, Perry, at the scene.
When they went to the witness to ask for a description, she
pointed to her window and said the person she saw breaking
into the car was standing in the parking lot, right next to a police
officer. Perry challenged the identification on due-process
grounds, arguing that it was equivalent to a one-person showup
that all but guaranteed he would be identified as the offender. He
lost the motion and was convicted of theft. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court rejected his argument, and the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed, 8-1.
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make up for the lack of discretion in the mandatory LWOP
schemes.104
Chief Justice Roberts penned the primary dissent. Joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, he pointed to the nearly
2,500 inmates serving LWOP sentences for crimes committed
as juveniles, and argued that it is therefore not “unusual” for a
murderer to receive an LWOP sentence. He noted that in deter-
mining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court
generally begins with “‘objective indicia of society’s standards,
as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice.’”105
Given the number of states that require and frequently impose
mandatory LWOP sentences upon juveniles, “there is no objec-
tive basis” for finding a “consensus against” the practice.106 Nor
is the majority’s decision supported by the prior holdings in
Roper and Graham, which were expressly limited to death
penalty and non-homicide prosecutions.107 Justice Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia, contended neither strand of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence relied upon by the majority is con-
sistent with the original understanding of the Cruel and
Unusual Clause. He also argued that in Harmelin v. Michigan,
the Court previously “declined to extend its individualized-sen-
tencing rule beyond the death penalty context.”108 Justice Alito,
joined by Justice Scalia, first questioned the concept of “evolv-
ing standards of decency,”109 and noted that “today’s decision
shows . . . that our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer tied
to any objective indicia of society’s standards.”110
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—DUE PROCESS
Two significant Due Process Clause cases were decided this
past Term. In one, the Court addressed the prosecution’s duty
to disclose notes that could have been used to impeach a key
witness. In the other, the justices turned aside a challenge to the
reliability of an eyewitness identification.
Brady obligations
This may be an unfair observation, but it almost seems like
whenever there is a Supreme Court ruling about a prosecutor’s
noncompliance with Brady v. Maryland,111 the Orleans Parish
district attorney’s office has offered up the vehicle.112 In Smith v.
Cain,113 the most recent of these cases, the Court ruled 8-1 that
the failure to comply with Brady required Smith’s conviction to
be vacated.
Smith was convicted of murder based upon the testimony of
a single witness, Boatner. In court, Boatner identified Smith as
the first of three gunmen to enter the home where five people
were killed. He said that he had been face-to-face with Smith at
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The opinion for the Court
was authored by Justice
Ginsburg. She first emphasized
that the Constitution protects
against a conviction based on
unreliable evidence primarily by
affording sufficient safeguards
for the adversary system to func-
tion: defendants have counsel,
confrontation, cross-examina-
tion, compulsory process, and
other rights. The leading eyewit-
ness identification decisions,
Neil v. Biggers117 and Manson v.
Brathwaite,118 make clear that
“due process concerns arise only
when law enforcement officers
use an identification procedure
that is both suggestive and unnecessary” and suppression of the
resulting identification depends upon “whether improper police
conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of misidentifica-
tion.’”119 But there is an important limitation. “The due process
check for reliability . . . comes into play only after the defendant
establishes improper police conduct.”120 Perry could not prevail
because the police engaged in no improper conduct; the officers
did not arrange the suggestive circumstances surrounding the
witness’s identification of Perry. The justices rejected Perry’s
argument for a broader application of the Due Process Clause,
saying that “[a] primary aim of excluding identification evi-
dence. . . is to deter law enforcement use of improper lineups,
showups, and photo arrays in the first place.”121 The Court also
turned aside the argument that eyewitness identifications are a
uniquely unreliable form of evidence in large part because “the
jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the reliability of evi-
dence.”122
Justice Sotomayor was the lone dissenter. She argued that the
Court’s cases establish the clear rule that admitting “out-of-
court eyewitness identifications derived from impermissibly
suggestive circumstances that pose a very substantial likelihood
of misidentification violates due process.”123 Nor is there any
distinction between intentional and unintentional suggestion.
Justice Sotomayor took issue with a number of other aspects of
the majority opinion, including the Court’s emphasis on a
deterrence rationale for exclusion. Citing empirical evidence
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification, she
argued that the majority adopted “an artificially narrow con-
ception of the dangers of suggestive identifications at a time
when our concerns should have deepened.”124
FIRST AMENDMENT
The Court issued two notable First Amendment cases this
Term.
In United States v. Alvarez,125 a much-anticipated decision,
the Court struck down the Stolen Valor Act. The Act prohibits
false representations of the receipt of military decorations, and
the penalties are enhanced if the representations concern the
Medal of Honor. Alvarez, a local official, lied at a public meet-
ing about receiving the Medal of Honor. Six justices agreed that
the Act violates the First Amendment, but split on the reasons.
A plurality held that content-based restrictions on speech are
permitted only when confined to certain traditional categories,
such as obscenity, defamation, and speech presenting some
imminent and grave threat. Writing for four justices, Justice
Kennedy rejected the government’s claim that false statements
have no value and hence are unprotected. They distinguished
statutes criminalizing acts such as perjury and false statements
to government officials; these provisions are narrower and do
not establish a general rule that false statements are unpro-
tected. Finally, even though the government asserted that the
Act protects compelling interests, “[t]he First Amendment
requires that the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech
at issue be ‘actually necessary’ to achieve its interest,”126 which
was not shown here. Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred in
the outcome, but on a different theory. Even when one reads the
statute narrowly as criminalizing “only false factual statements
made with knowledge of their falsity and with the intent that
they be taken as true,” the statute lacks “any . . . limiting fea-
tures” such as context or proof of injury.127 As drafted, it “works
disproportionate constitutional harm.”128 Justice Alito, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented. In their view, the
statute “reaches only knowingly false statements about hard
facts directly within a speaker’s personal knowledge. These lies
have no value . . . and proscribing them does not chill any valu-
able speech.”129 The dissenters argued that “there are more than
100 federal criminal statutes that punish false statements made
in connection with areas of federal agency concern,”130 and the
Act, like those, does not infringe the First Amendment.
Reichle v. Howards131 was a civil-rights action brought by a
plaintiff who was arrested by Secret Service agents after meet-
ing Vice President Cheney at a public event. The plaintiff,
Howards, told the Vice President that his policies in Iraq were
“disgusting,” and Howards touched the Vice President’s shoul-
der. Agent Reichle stopped Howards, who denied touching the
Vice President, and was arrested. The agent had probable cause
to arrest Howards for making a false statement to a federal offi-
cial, but Howards alleged that the arrest was in retaliation for
criticizing the Vice President, in violation of the First
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Amendment. The case raised two questions: whether a plaintiff
may raise a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim despite the
presence of probable cause to arrest, and whether the agent was
entitled to qualified immunity. The Court did not reach the first
question; it determined that the agent was entitled to qualified
immunity.
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. The qualified-immunity
question turned on the impact of Hartman v. Moore,132 which
held that a plaintiff cannot claim retaliatory prosecution in vio-
lation of the First Amendment if probable cause supported the
charges. Reichle was entitled to qualified immunity because
Hartman’s impact on the precedent governing retaliatory arrests
was not clear, and a reasonable official “could have interpreted
Hartman’s rationale to apply to retaliatory arrests.”133 Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in the judgment. Secret Service
agents must make swift decisions about the safety of public offi-
cials, and they may take into account words spoken to or near
the person whose safety is their charge.134
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
In last year’s summary of Supreme Court decisions, I wrote
that the 2010-11 Term gave us several landmark habeas corpus
rulings, including Harrington v. Richter135 and Cullen v.
Pinholster.136 This Term may be remembered as much for its
pattern of summary reversals in habeas cases as for any of the
individual rulings. In no fewer than six cases, the justices
granted certiorari and summarily reversed decisions of courts of
appeals that had granted federal habeas corpus relief to state
inmates.137
The summary reversals came throughout the year. Setting
the tone, the very first opinion of the Term was Cavazos v.
Smith,138 where the majority held that the court of appeals had
erred in finding that the state court had unreasonably applied
the “sufficiency of the evidence” standard of Jackson v.
Virginia.139 In Smith, six justices emphasized the deference due
to state courts under AEDPA as well as the deference afforded
to jury verdicts under Jackson.140 The dissenters argued that
certiorari should have been denied and that the Court was
merely engaging in error correction.141
After leading off with Smith, summary reversals followed in
Bobby v. Dixon (the Miranda case), Hardy v. Cross (under
AEDPA, the state court did not unreasonably apply
Confrontation Clause precedents),142 Wetzel v. Lambert (habeas
relief should not be granted
“unless each ground supporting
the state court decision is exam-
ined and found to be unreason-
able under AEDPA”),143
Coleman v. Johnson (the state
court denied a Jackson v.
Virginia claim “and that deter-
mination in turn is entitled to
considerable deference under
AEDPA”),144 and Parker v.
Matthews (the court of appeals
decision “is a textbook example
of what [AEDPA] proscribes:
‘using federal habeas corpus
review as a vehicle to second-
guess the reasonable decisions
of state courts’”).145
In Greene v. Fisher,146 an unusual case (heck, this one was
actually argued), a unanimous Court sent another message
about the limits of federal habeas corpus review under AEDPA.
The main Supreme Court precedent case on which Greene
relied was issued after his state post-conviction petition was
decided but before it was made final. The Court ruled that
AEDPA requires federal courts to measure state-court decisions
against the Supreme Court’s precedents at the time the state
courts render their decisions.
Four cases about procedural default are also important to
note, including what may turn out to be the most significant
individual habeas decision of the Term, Martinez v. Ryan.147 The
question in Martinez was whether an inmate can raise ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel for the first time in federal court when
the claim was not properly presented in state court due to coun-
sel’s errors. The case came from Arizona, and state law does not
permit ineffective assistance of counsel to be raised on direct
appeal; rather, the claim can only be brought in a state post-
conviction petition. Martinez’s lawyer, however, failed to do so.
The court of appeals had ruled that under Coleman v.
Thompson,148 an attorney’s errors in a post-conviction proceed-
ing cannot amount to cause to excuse a procedural default. The
Supreme Court disagreed, by a vote of 7-2.
With Justice Kennedy writing for the Court, the majority
modified what many had taken as a blanket rule in Coleman.
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The Martinez Court “qualifie[d]
Coleman by recognizing a nar-
row exception: Inadequate assis-
tance of counsel at initial-review
collateral proceedings may
establish cause for a prisoner’s
procedural default of a claim of
ineffective assistance at trial.”149
In Coleman, the alleged failure of
counsel was on appeal from an
initial-review collateral proceed-
ing, and the claims had been
addressed by the state habeas
trial court. By contrast,
“[w]here, as here, the initial-
review collateral proceeding is
the first designated proceeding
for a prisoner to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial,
the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a
prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.”150
When a State requires an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
to be raised in a collateral state proceeding, two circumstances
can provide cause to excuse a default of that claim. One is if the
state courts did not appoint counsel in the initial-review collat-
eral proceeding for the claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. The second is where appointed counsel in the initial-review
collateral proceedings is in turn ineffective under Strickland v.
Washington.151 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dis-
sented. They denounced the majority’s claim “that today’s hold-
ing is no more than a ‘limited qualification’ to Coleman,” calling
it instead “a repudiation of the longstanding principle govern-
ing procedural default, which Coleman and other cases consis-
tently applied.”152
Maples v. Thomas,153 another procedural-default case with
the same lineup of justices, is interesting though somewhat fact
specific. Maples, an inmate on death row in Alabama, missed
the deadline to file an appeal from the denial of his state post-
conviction petition. He had been represented in his post-con-
viction petition by two associates at a New York law firm, who
left the firm while the case was pending. When the trial-level
court denied relief, the notice of the court’s order (which had
been mailed to the associates) was returned unopened. After
missing the deadline to appeal and losing in several efforts to
bring a late appeal, Maples filed a federal habeas corpus peti-
tion. It was dismissed due to the procedural default. The
Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the
Court noted the general rule that when a post-conviction attor-
ney misses a filing deadline, the petitioner is bound by the error
and cannot rely upon it for cause to excuse a procedural
default. But Maples’ lawyers left him without notice. “Having
severed the principal-agent relationship, an attorney no longer
acts, or fails to act, as the client’s representative.”154 Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented, disagreeing with the majority’s
conclusion that Maples was essentially unrepresented at the
critical time. They added that “if the interest of fairness justifies
our excusing Maples’ procedural default here, it does so when-
ever a defendant’s procedural default is caused by his attorney.
That is simply not the law—and cannot be, if the states are to
have an orderly system of criminal litigation conducted by
counsel.”155
The last two procedural-default cases are worth a brief men-
tion. In Wood v. Milyard,156 the justices held that courts of
appeals, like the district courts, have the authority but not the
obligation to raise a forfeited timeliness defense on their own
initiative. However, a court of appeals abuses its discretion by
dismissing a habeas petition as untimely where that ground has
been intentionally waived by the State. Finally, in Gonzalez v.
Thaler,157 the Court addressed an issue about the specificity of
certificates of appealability but, more importantly for our pur-
poses, clarified an aspect of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limita-
tions. Under AEDPA, the limitations period runs from the lat-
est to occur among  four dates set out by statute. 158 One of
those is the date on which the state court judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review of the expiration of time
for seeking review. The justices held that “with respect to a state
prisoner who does not seek review in a State’s highest court, the
judgment becomes ‘final’ under [AEDPA] when the time for
seeking such review expires.”159
ODDS AND ENDS
A few other decisions are important to note.
The interrelationship of federal and state sentences
Setser v. United States160 holds that a federal district court
may order a federal sentence to run consecutively to a state sen-
tence that has not yet been imposed. Setser pleaded guilty to a
federal drug offense. He also had pending state probation-viola-
tion and drug charges. At sentencing, the federal judge ordered
Setser’s federal sentence to run consecutively to any state sen-
tence for the probation violation but concurrently with any sen-
tence imposed on the new drug charge. The state court subse-
quently sentenced him to 5 years for probation violation and 10
years on the new drug charge, to be served concurrently.161 The
majority read the applicable federal statute, 18 U.S.C. §
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3584(a), as affording discretion to federal judges to specify
whether a federal sentence is concurrent or consecutive to a
yet-to-be-imposed state term, even though such discretion is
not explicit in the statute. The Court turned aside an argument
that this made Setser’s sentence unreasonable in light of the
state court’s later decision to run the sentences concurrently.162
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, dis-
sented. They read § 3584 as providing authority to specify con-
secutive or concurrent sentences only when a federal judge is
the second sentencer. Justice Breyer (one of the original mem-
bers of the U.S. Sentencing Commission) wrote that that inter-
pretation was most consistent with the purposes of the 1984
Sentencing Reform Act, which favors concurrent sentences
when the separate convictions are based upon the same relevant
conduct, and this determination would ordinarily best be made
by the second sentencing court.163
Grand jury witness immunity
In Rehberg v. Paulk,164 a unanimous Court held that a grand
jury witness is entitled to the same absolute immunity from fed-
eral civil rights liability as a witness who testifies at trial. The
witness, Paulk, was an investigator for the local district attor-
ney. He testified several times before a county grand jury, which
returned several indictments against Rehberg. Rehberg brought
an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Paulk conspired
to present and did present false testimony. In finding that Paulk
was entitled to absolute immunity, the Court noted that just as
with trial witnesses, “a witness’ fear of retaliatory litigation may
deprive the tribunal of critical evidence. And in neither context
is the deterrent of potential civil liability needed” to prevent
perjury.165
A LOOK AHEAD
As this article goes to press (prior to the Court’s September
and October conferences), it is still too early to handicap the
upcoming Term. But a few interesting cases are already in the
hopper. The justices are slated to determine whether Padilla v.
Kentucky166—the landmark ruling on advice of the immigration
consequences of a plea—applies to convictions that became
final before its announcement.167 The Court will also decide
whether federal habeas corpus proceedings may be stayed for
capital defendants who are mentally incompetent.168
Fourth Amendment cases are perhaps attracting the greatest
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amount of early interest. Bailey v. United States169 asks if officers
can detain a person while executing a search warrant when the
person already left the immediate vicinity before the warrant is
executed. Then there is the doggie duo. The issue in Florida v.
Harris170 is whether an alert by a narcotics-detection dog pro-
vides probable cause to search a vehicle. Florida v. Jardines171
asks if a drug dog’s sniff at the front door of a home amounts to
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. You
may or may not agree with his legal analysis, but it is hard to
beat the prose of Time columnist Joel Stein, who opined about
Jardines: “The outcome depends on whether the court sees a
dog as a gadget like a thermal imager or as a human who can
invade your privacy by smelling private smells. My take is, if
you think dog sniffing isn’t an invasion of privacy, then you
don’t have a crotch.”172
CONCLUSION
The past Term was big. The Court gave us thrills,173 chills,174
and spills,175 with transformative decisions about searches,
effective assistance of counsel, jury trials, and juvenile life sen-
tences. Can the next Term top it? We’ll see.
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